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Homosexuality as cultural battleground in the Middle East: 
culture and postcolonial international theory 
Katerina Dalacoura 
 
The culture wars over homosexuality in the Middle East are studied 
here in the context of the theoretical debate on culture in International 
Relations and, more speciﬁcally, through a critical examination of 
postcolonial international theory. The paper argues that, although 
postcolonialism can offer a useful framework, it also has, in its 
poststructuralist variants, signiﬁcant limitations in addressing the con- 
troversial issues surrounding homosexuality as cultural battleground 
in the Middle East. These limitations derive from an unconvincing 
interpretation of the relationship between the Middle East and moder- 
nity; and a problematic approach towards moral agency. The paper 
serves a dual purpose. Through the use of the empirical material, it 
furthers the debate within postcolonial international theory by bring- 
ing evidence to bear in support of its humanist or materialist strands. 
The theoretical discussion, in turn, by highlighting the intertwining of 
culture and power in the debates on homosexuality, strengthens the 
case for respecting homosexual rights in the Middle East region. 
 
Introduction 
Homosexuality has, in recent years, become a source of intense cultural contesta- 
tions at a global level. These contestations are frequently understood as pitting 
Western against non-Western actors and values, with the former seen as defending 
homosexual rights and the latter opposing them. This is a simpliﬁcation, of course, 
and in some instances it is wrong. Social tolerance and legal acceptance of homo- 
sexuality in the West – in so far as we can generalise about it at all – is recent and, 
at best, partial; homophobia is still pervasive; practice, as opposed to the law, 
remains discriminatory. In non-Western societies attitudes are varied and complex. 
Nevertheless, in international diplomatic fora and in global media the binary 
between ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ – crude and misguided though it is – has become 
pervasive. For example, in Uganda since 2011, despite the intervention of 
American Christian evangelical groups in support of anti-gay legislation, the fur- 
ore surrounding homosexual rights has unfolded in terms of ‘African’  against 
‘Western’ values.1  In Liberia the president of the country and Nobel Peace Prize 
winner, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, defended in 2012 the criminalisation of homosexu- 
ality in her country by declaring: ‘We like ourselves just the way we are’.2 
As in parts of Africa, in the Middle East opposition to homosexuality has 
become a means of afﬁrming cultural integrity and authenticity. Homosexuality 
has been rendered an element in the region’s  ‘culture  wars’;  this is a term used 
in a variety of Middle Eastern contexts since the 1990s to refer to the contesta- 
tion within and also between societies over identity issues, often couched in 
terms of moral values. In the culture wars over homosexuality in the Middle 
East cultural integrity and authenticity are almost invariably (this is no exaggera- 
tion) deﬁned and asserted in juxtaposition to the West, which either epitomises 
the threatening cultural outsider or becomes a tangible opponent through the 
actions and policies of governments, NGOs and individual activists. 
Human rights violations over sexual orientation and identity in the Middle 
East are widespread and well-documented.
3 
A number of brave and notable 
exceptions notwithstanding,
4 
mobilisation of Middle Eastern civil society groups 
on behalf of homosexual rights remains limited. Resistance to such rights on the 
   
part of Middle Eastern governments, and social leaders of all hues, continues to 
be staunch. The domestic battles over homosexuality in Middle Eastern societies 
are also partly played out  at  the  level of  international diplomacy. When,  in 
2003, Brazil proposed a resolution to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
condemning human rights violations originating from prejudices towards sexual 
orientation, there was strong opposition from a number of African countries, 
Russia, the Holy See and conservative lobby groups and NGOs.
5   
However, the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC),
6  
which represents 57 states, also 
played a pivotal role, with the ambassador of Pakistan reportedly denying the 
existence of homosexuality in his country.
7
 
My starting point in this paper is that the culture wars over homosexuality in 
the Middle East are a legitimate and signiﬁcant focus for debate in International 
Relations (IR). Although not wars in the conventional sense, but only metaphori- 
cally, culture wars shape people’s lives on a personal and collective basis, caus- 
ing untold misery and even physical injury and death. They are, furthermore, 
symptomatic of a global resurgence of culture as a focal point both in domestic 
and international politics. In the post-cold war world, characterised by self-ful- 
ﬁlling prophecies of clashing civilisations, contestations over culture became 
powerful determinants of international relations.  In the 1990s  a  number  of 
bloody conﬂicts – for instance in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda – appeared 
to centre on identity. Religion, as an aspect of identity and a source of political 
contention, was also in the ascendant in the post-cold war setting, with the 
resurgence of fundamentalist movements and a growing putative association 
between certain religious beliefs, terrorism and violence. 
IR has engaged with these events and trends at a theoretical level.
8  
The 
discipline was already becoming receptive to the causal signiﬁcance of ideas 
meanings, perceptions, norms and values in international relations. As it moved 
away from treating material factors as the primary or sole determinants of world 
politics it  became more hospitable to  the  notion  that  culture does  matter in 
world politics and that theory must accommodate it and account for its role. 
Arguably IR  had been already dealing with issues that later came to be deﬁned 
as ‘culture’. Nevertheless, the explicit use of the term ‘culture’ marked a shift in 
the parameters of the debate, manifested in a proliferation of articles, mono- 
graphs and edited volumes.
9
 
The growing focus on culture within IR  is possibly one reason, among many 
others, for the convergence between postcolonialism and IR  theory. After a per- 
iod  of  relative  neglect  of  the  work  of  Edward  Said,
10    
postcolonialism has 
become a focus of debate in IR, to the point that postcolonial international theory 
is now a distinct and signiﬁcant branch of IR theory. While leaving aside the 
broader question of postcolonial international theory’s strengths and weaknesses, 
this paper argues that it offers a suitable and valuable theoretical framework for 
understanding the debate on homosexuality in the Middle East. This is for two 
reasons. First, many of the authors who have dealt with the question of homo- 
sexuality in the Middle East, as we will see below, have done so through a 
postcolonial lens, so in a way the paper builds on an existing debate. Second, 
and more directly in IR  terms, postcolonial theory – alongside constructivism 
and the English School – engages directly with the role of culture in interna- 
tional relations. All three schools of thought, exceptionally in the context of IR 
theory, go beyond enquiring whether culture plays a role to addressing the ques- 
tion ‘how  does culture play a role?’  in international relations. However, while 
constructivism and the English School place culture in international relations 
alongside power (understood in the realist sense of military and political power), 
   
for postcolonial IR  theory culture is power; in other words, it is the stuff of 
ferocious and often violent conﬂict and constitutes an element in very unequal 
relationships. 
The deﬁnitions of ‘culture’ are numerous and this has sown confusion; fur- 
thermore, the term is used all too easily in a vague, ‘catch-all’  fashion, often 
when other concepts are found lacking. In a broad sense ‘culture’ is ‘any  inter- 
personally shared system of meanings, perceptions and values’.11   Within Eng- 
lish-speaking IR  and for the purposes of this discussion, however, culture has 
two, more speciﬁc meanings (which are distinct, though inter-related): on the 
one hand, it refers to modes and norms of artistic expression and aesthetic 
appreciation and, on the other hand, to the body of ideas, values and practices 
which serve as a marker of collective identity. Postcolonial authors use culture 
in both senses, as we will see below. However, when it comes to the culture 
wars on homosexuality in the Middle East, culture is seen, by participants, as an 
identity issue and cultural authenticity is presented as a tangible characteristic, 
an ‘essence’, which must be protected from outside attacks and attempts to 
undermine it. 
The paper has three parts. The ﬁrst outlines my interpretation of the history of 
same-sex relations and the emergence of the concept of homosexuality in the 
Middle East and offers a snapshot of the current contestations over homosexuality 
and culture in the region. The second part posits the view that, although postcolo- 
nialism can help us make sense of these contestations, its poststructuralist strand, 
represented in particular by Joseph Massad’s  writings, rests on a dubious and 
unconvincing interpretation of the relationship between the Middle East and 
modernity and undermines the idea that the participants in the culture wars on 
homosexuality in the Middle East are free and responsible moral agents. The third 
part returns to the broader theoretical discussion and shows how the paper’s ﬁnd- 
ings strengthen the humanist or materialist strands of postcolonial international 
theory. 
 
 
Same-sex relations and the concept of homosexuality  in Middle 
Eastern societies 
The framing of the culture wars over homosexuality in the Middle East may 
suggest a picture of starkly juxtaposed cultures perennially clashing over this 
issue, but actually masks a long and complex history. The identiﬁcation of heter- 
osexuality with cultural authenticity in Middle Eastern societies is a distortion of 
the historical record. Although not overtly discussed and acknowledged, and 
despite being forbidden by law, same-sex relations and homoerotic love, as well 
as pederasty, were widely practised across Middle Eastern societies for many 
centuries.
12
 
In the Koran, the holy book of Islam which is the majority religion in the 
Middle East region, a number of verses (though very few, in actual fact) refer to 
same sex relations directly and indirectly.
13  
There is a reference to sodomy in a 
hadith conﬁrmed by various imams: ‘If  you ﬁnd two men practising the action 
of the people of Lot [sodomy] kill that who has an active sexual role and that 
who has a passive sexual role’.14   The debate on the interpretation of sources 
was intense and continues to be so,
15   
but it is fair to say that that sodomy 
became prohibited by both Sunni and Shia Islamic law.
16
 
Despite these religious and legal prohibitions, however, ‘same-sex  relation- 
ships for men and women in the Mediterranean–Muslim world were implicitly 
recognised cultural practices, as long as they remained discreet and respected 
certain conventions’.17  In his magisterial history of Islam, Marshall Hodgson 
   
shows that in Islam’s  ‘middle  period’,  from the mid-10th century until around 
1500, there existed ‘a conventional pattern of homosexual relations’,18  often 
between an older man and adolescent youth. While cautioning against the ‘unex- 
amined sexual assumptions’  with which Western literature is replete, Hodgson 
summarises the matter thus: 
 
Despite strong Shar’i disapproval, the sexual relations of a mature man with a 
subordinate youth were so readily accepted in upper-class circles that there was 
often little or no effort to conceal their existence. Sometimes it seems to have 
been socially more acceptable to speak of a man’s  attachment to a youth than to 
speak of his women, who were supposed to be invisible in the inner courts. The 
fashion entered into poetry, especially in the Persian. The narrative poetry, indeed, 
conventionally told of love affairs between men and women; but the person to 
whom lyric love verse is addressed by male poets was conventionally, and almost 
without exception, made explicitly male. 
19
 
 
A more  recent work  by  Khaled  el-Rouayheb on  the  cultural history  of  the 
Arab-Islamic world shows that in  the Arabic literature of  the early Ottoman 
period (1516-1798) there were numerous casual and sometimes sympathetic 
allusions to homosexual love,
20   
and that ‘Much  if not most of the extant love 
poetry of the period is pederastic in tone, portraying an adult male poet’s  pas- 
sionate love for a  teenage boy’.21   Rouayheb suggests that, although sodomy 
was prohibited by Islamic law and religious scholars viewed it as an abominable 
sin, ‘many of them clearly did not believe that falling in love with a boy or 
expressing this love in verse was therefore also illicit’.22 
The 19th and early 20th centuries, however, brought major changes in atti- 
tudes towards same-sex relations. Michel Foucault’s description of the emer- 
gence of the concept of homosexuality in Europe can help us interpret these 
changes by placing them in a wider historical perspective.
23   
Foucault argued 
that ‘the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was con- 
stituted from the moment it was characterised’,24  speciﬁcally in Westphal’s 1870 
article in Archiv für Neurologie. ‘The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; 
the homosexual was now a species.’25   He argued that, from the 18th century, 
the beginning of the persecution of peripheral sexualities entailed 
 
an incorporation of perversions and a new speciﬁcation of individuals. As deﬁned 
by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; 
their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical object of them. The nine- 
teenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a child- 
hood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an 
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into 
his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality.
26
 
 
Other analysts credit broad social and economic forces, including urbanisation 
and industrialisation – not only medical–psychiatric discourse and labelling prac- 
tices – with playing an important role in the formation of modern homosexual 
roles.
27   
Be that as it may, and irrespective of causation, the key point here is 
that, from the 19th century on, the concept of homosexuality begins to emerge 
in the Middle East as well. There, as elsewhere across the colonised world (for 
instance in Africa and India), developments ran in parallel and almost contem- 
poraneously to those in Europe.
28
 
As homosexuality gradually became a distinct category in the 19th century 
Middle East, it also started to attract opprobrium and disapproval.
29  
This was 
partly the result of European cultural inﬂuences and morals, which were highly 
   
critical and condemnatory of homosexuality and affected the region through 
colonial penetration. European travellers complained about the openness with 
which men in the Ottoman Empire expressed their passion for boys.
30  
In his 
travels to Paris between 1826 and 1831 the eminent Islamic scholar Rifa’ah 
Tahtawi noted that the love of boys in Europe was considered morally reprehen- 
sible and thought that was how it should be.
31  
Similar processes were occurring 
in Iran. The Qajar period (1785–1925) started with notions of  beauty which 
were not gender-differentiated but this had changed by the end of the 19th cen- 
tury.
32  
Male beauty as an object of desire was disavowed and beauty was femin- 
ised.   Love   was   ‘heterosexualised’;   ‘Iranians   became   acutely   aware   that 
Europeans considered love and sex between older and younger men as prevalent 
in Iran and that they considered it a vice’.33 
By the 20th century many Arab historians and literary historians had become 
hostile towards homosexuality and uncomfortable with the pederastic themes in 
their literary heritage. European Victorian attitudes were adopted by the new, 
modern-educated and Westernised elites.
34   
The shift against same-sex relations 
was associated with modernisation. Love of boys became a sign of ‘backward- 
ness’  and  ‘progress,   rationality  and  civilization’  required  its  suppression.35 
According to Afary, in the Middle East ‘[The] notion of modernization now 
included the normalization of heterosexual eros and the abandonment of all 
homosexual practices and even inclinations’. 36 
In the second half of the 20th century a further important transformation 
occurred in attitudes towards homosexuality in the Middle East. Having now 
taken root as a distinct category, homosexuality began to be seen not only as 
reprehensible but also – and herein lay the new development - as an integral 
part of the Western cultural onslaught against ‘authentic’ Middle Eastern cul- 
tures. This was partly a response to the observation that the West was becoming 
more accepting towards homosexuality. However, it also meant gradually forget- 
ting that the identiﬁcation and condemnation of ‘the homosexual’ had been pre- 
viously integrally linked in the Middle East with European colonialism. 
Homophobia is frequently associated with the rise of Islamism in the Middle 
East. However, we saw above that the rejection of homosexuality was associated 
with  modernisation and  its  values.
37   
The  stigmatisation of  homosexuality is 
shared by the religious and the secularists (as well as Muslims and Christians).
38
 
For example, the period preceding the 1979 revolution in Iran witnessed a back- 
lash against the Shah’s  gender reforms, with leftist critics of Pahlavi autocracy, 
Western imperialism and consumerism partially joining forces with conservative 
Islamists against the  regime.
39   
Ali  Shariati, the  leftist-Islamist thinker whose 
writings were pivotal in the intellectual movement against the Shah, condemned 
the Western ‘cultural revolution’, especially the emancipation of women, and 
denounced the Western ‘recognition of an openly gay lifestyle’. Reacting partic- 
ularly to the small gay male subculture that by the 1970s was taking root in 
elite circles in Tehran, and ignoring century-old practices which still persisted, 
Shariati ‘accused the West of recognizing a vice that the Middle East had 
refused’.40  In modern day Turkey Kemalists and Islamists share equally negative 
responses to homosexuality but ‘the former [Kemalists] are probably more hate- 
ful because it threatens the essence and principles of the Republic’.41 
Nevertheless, if antipathy to homosexuality in the Middle East cannot be 
exclusively associated with Islamism, there is no doubt that the latter’s rise and 
expansion after the 1970s exacerbated the tendency to vilify homosexuality and 
depict it as part of the West’s corrupting cultural inﬂuence. The Islamic Republic 
which was installed in Iran following the revolution increased and systematised 
the persecution of homosexuals. The war against openly gay men and transgres- 
   
sive heterosexual women intensiﬁed in the post-2005 period of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The torture and execution of two teenage boys in 
July 2005 made international headlines. Ahmadinejad claimed that in Iran there 
were no homosexuals, ‘not one’.42 
An instance of the degree to which homosexuality has become an issue of 
contention in the Middle East was the ‘Queen Boat’  case, a cause célèbre in 
Egypt in the early part of the 2000s.
43   
In May 2001 the Egyptian authorities 
raided the gay nightclub Queen Boat in Cairo and arrested 52 individuals. The 
case caused a furore inside but also outside Egypt and led to its international 
condemnation for the persecution of homosexuals. It was also discussed in the 
context of the UN Human Rights Council 2011 Report on homosexuality men- 
tioned in the introduction. 
Homosexuality is not actually an offence on the Egyptian statute books, so 
those arrested on Queen Boat were charged with and convicted on the grounds 
of ‘debauchery’ or fujur, as well as for ‘contempt for religion’.44  (Though 
amended in 1961, the law on fujur was initially introduced by Egyptian nation- 
alists in 1951 as part of the anti-colonial struggle against British ‘immorality’. It 
speciﬁcally targeted state-licensed brothels, which serviced the British military.) 
In the intense debate on the Queen Boat case in Egypt, homosexuality was con- 
structed as a threat to the country’s  culture, as articulated in the chief prosecu- 
tor’s  statement that ‘Egypt  has not and will not be a den for the corruption of 
manhood, and homosexual groups will not establish themselves here’.45   ‘Gay’ 
dress was described as ‘un-Egyptian’ and homosexuality was deemed to be part 
of ‘the  globalisation of perversion’,  a Western-driven process. The outcry from 
international rights groups, the European Parliament and Western governments 
conﬁrmed that the West was intervening in defence of homosexuality, enabling 
government ofﬁcials to depict the prosecutions as a way of protecting Egyptian 
cultural values from Western decadence. Caught in the middle, Egyptian human 
rights movements became divided over the issue and ultimately refused to stand 
up for the rights of the homosexuals.
46
 
The Queen Boat case, and others similar to it, reveals how ‘cultural  authen- 
ticity’ can be constructed as a collective good which needs to be protected from 
outside attack. In this case, because authenticity was deﬁned ‘against’ the West, 
the latter represented the cultural opponent against whom ‘local’ values must be 
defended. Culture can therefore assume a clear dimension as a focus of identity 
in domestic society and form the basis for an international confrontation. The 
irony is that legal instruments which are used to censure and persecute homo- 
sexuals derive from European criminal codes, often the Napoleonic codes,
47  
as 
Asad AbuKhalil reminds us: 
 
What passes in present-day Saudi Arabia, for example, as sexual conservatism is 
due more to Victorian puritanism than to Islamic mores. It is quite inaccurate to 
attribute prevailing sexual mores in present-day Arab society to Islam. Originally, 
Islam did not have the same harsh Biblical judgement about homosexuality as 
Christianity. Homophobia, as an ideology of hostility toward people who are 
homosexual, was produced by the Christian West. Homophobic inﬂuences in Arab 
cultures are relatively new, and many were introduced…from Western sources.48 
 
 
 
  Homosexuality, modernity and moral agency 
The interpretation of the history of same-sex relations and homosexuality in the 
Middle East in the above section suggests that, in the relations between states, 
   
societies and regions, culture and power are inextricably linked. It is precisely 
because postcolonialism studies culture, not alongside power but as intertwined 
with it, that  it  constitutes  a  useful  analytical  framework  for  the  case  of 
homosexuality as cultural battleground. This section demonstrates why this is so 
by brieﬂy outlining the postcolonial understanding of culture introduced by 
Edward Said. It subsequently contends that the post-structuralist strand within 
postcolonialism – of which one author who deals with homosexuality in the 
Middle East, Joseph  Massad,  is  emblematic  – is  wide  of  the  mark  in  its 
approach to modernity and moral agency in relation to homosexuality. 
Culture is at the core of Edward Said’s  work, and in particular of Oriental- 
ism (1978),
49  
which laid the foundation of postcolonialism as a distinct school 
of thought. Said links culture to Gramsci’s  notion of hegemony: ‘The  relation- 
ship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of 
varying degrees of a complex hegemony’.50   Hegemony relies more on consent 
than on coercion. According to Gramsci, hegemonic elites create a cultural sys- 
tem that promotes such consent and legitimises their position. Culture is there- 
fore part of the reproduction of social and economic systems of power. Said 
uses Gramsci’s framework to argue that Orientalism is part of the idea of Eur- 
ope, an idea that crucially depends on the depiction of European identity as 
superior to non-European peoples and cultures.
51  
Said also employs Foucault’s 
notion of a discourse to deﬁne Orientalism as ‘a  Western style for dominating, 
restructuring and having authority over the Orient’.52  For Foucault identity is 
culturally constructed through a series of exclusions. Said builds on Foucault to 
argue that European literary and academic texts are pervaded by pernicious rep- 
resentations of the Islamic and Middle Eastern worlds. For Said power has a 
crucial role in the production and dissemination of the various ‘truths’ regarding 
the Oriental ‘other’.  In a later work, Culture and Imperialism, Said argues that 
imperialism was served by cultural forms such as the novel and that this contin- 
ues to be the case, even after the formal end of colonialism. 
Said deﬁned culture as ‘those practices, like the arts of description, commu- 
nication and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, 
social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose 
principal aims is pleasure’.53  He also saw it as ‘a concept that includes a reﬁn- 
ing and elevating element, each society’s  reservoir of the best that has been 
known and thought’.54  I noted in the Introduction the two distinct, though inter- 
linked senses of ‘culture’, as artistic production, on the one hand, and as a focus 
of identity, on the other. From the above deﬁnitions, particularly the second, it 
would seem that Said understood the term ‘culture’ in both senses, or even as 
being somewhere between the two. He placed culture at the core of international 
relations. Conversely, he treated the international dimension as crucial in his 
understanding of culture.
55
 
Said’s placing of culture within an international context, and his linking of it 
with power, highlight two crucial aspects of the culture wars over homosexuality 
in the Middle East. One author who joined the intense political and academic 
debate on homosexuality in the Middle East, using Said’s approach and con- 
cepts as a basis, is Joseph Massad.
56   
Massad argues that the West’s apparent 
intent to ‘protect’ the rights of homosexual men and women is part and parcel 
of its hegemonic project, which is underpinned by exporting ideas and concepts 
(such as ‘homosexual’  or ‘gay’).  The ‘Gay International’,  as he calls it – the 
network of global activists which promotes homosexual rights – ‘creates’ the 
homosexuals  it  allegedly  seeks  to  protect  and  actually  harms  them.  The 
   
 
emergent agenda of sexual rights, more generally, which the West international- 
ised in the 1980s and 1990s through ‘international’  human rights activism has 
made women and ‘homosexuals’ the two prime victims of human rights viola- 
tions in Arab countries.
57  
This passage summarises Massad’s argument well and 
deserves to be quoted at length: 
 
By inciting discourse about homosexuals where none existed before, the Gay 
International is in fact heterosexualizing a world that is being forced to be ﬁxed 
by a Western binary. Because most non-Western societies, including Muslim Arab 
societies, have not subscribed historically to these categories, their imposition is 
eliciting less than liberatory outcomes: men who are considered the ‘passive’  or 
‘receptive’  parties in  male–male sexual contacts are forced to  have one  object 
choice and identify as homosexual or gay, just as men who are the ‘active’ parties 
are also forced to limit their sexual aim to one object choice, either women or 
men. As most ‘active’ partners see themselves as part of a societal norm, so heter- 
osexuality becomes compulsory given that the alternative, as presented by the Gay 
International, means becoming marked outside the norm – with all the attendant 
risks and disadvantages of such a marking. Also, most Arab and Muslim countries 
that do not have laws against sexual conduct between men respond to the Gay 
International’s  incitement to discourse by professing antihomosexual stances on a 
nationalist basis. This is leading to police harassment in some cases and could 
lead to antihomosexual legislation. Those countries that already have unenforced 
laws begin to enforce them. Ironically, this is the very process through which 
‘homosexuality’ was invented in the West. 
 
It is not the Gay International or its upper-class supporters in the Arab diaspora 
who  will  be  persecuted, but  rather the  poor  and  nonurban men  who  practice 
same-sex contact and who do not necessarily identify as homosexual or gay.
58
 
 
Massad makes a number of valid points. He highlights the often-neglected issue 
of class and its impact on the debate on homosexuality in the Middle East. He 
also emphasises the need to place the debate within an international context in 
order to reveal all its dimensions. However, his argument hinges on a ﬂawed 
assumption: that the Middle East lacked the concept of homosexuality before 
the ‘Gay  International’ introduced it in the 1980s. He writes, as we saw above: 
‘Because most non-Western societies, including Muslim Arab societies, have not 
subscribed historically to these categories [homosexual, heterosexual], their 
imposition is eliciting less than liberatory outcomes’.59   The word ‘historically’ 
is used vaguely here but, for his argument to be consistent, Massad can only be 
saying that the concept of ‘the homosexual’ became prevalent in the region after 
the 1980s – and that this happened as a result of a Western imposition, a point 
to be taken up below. 
Massad’s argument echoes a number of postcolonial interpretations of 
modernity which emphasise difference as opposed to commonality and suggest 
distinct historical experiences rather than a common universal experience. For 
Siba Grovogui, postcolonialism, while rejecting ‘native  essentialism’,  entertains 
the possibility of alternative conceptions of society, law and morals and aspires 
to  a  different kind  of  universalism, based  on  deliberation and  contestations 
among diverse political entities.
60  
Gurminder Bhambra speaks of ‘multiple mod- 
ernities’  as  opposed  to  modernity.61    LHM  Ling  and  Anna  Agathangelou’s 
   
 
approach to world politics is based on a vision of ‘multiple  worlds’ which are 
‘entwined’.62  Phillip Darby and AJ Paolini refer to the ‘heterogenity of meaning 
and narrative’.63 
In contrast to Massad and in (indirect) criticism of the above thinkers, how- 
ever, the history of same-sex relations and homosexuality, as presented by the 
research discussed in this paper, reveals a picture of commonality rather than 
difference between Europe and the Middle East. We saw above that the emer- 
gence of the concepts of homosexuality and heterosexuality in the Middle East 
from the 19th century onwards – in a parallel (in the sense of both similar and 
contemporaneous) albeit not identical process to that in Europe – is well docu- 
mented by researchers such as Afary, Rouayheb and Najmabadi.
64  
Murray and 
Roscoe (although not subscribing to the notion that modernity represents a sharp 
‘break’  when it comes to the idea of homosexuality) suggest that Western and 
non-Western societies have a lot in common in their approaches to homosexual- 
ity. In their words: ‘What might be termed “pre-modern”, “modern”, and “post- 
modern”  homosexualities actually co-exist in contemporary societies, Western 
and non-Western’.65 General histories of the region, for example the work of 
Hodgson,
66  
already mentioned, and Timothy Mitchell,
67  
reinforce the view that 
modernity as a conceptual sea-change engulfed the Middle East from the 19th 
century onwards. None of this implies that the Middle East became ‘like’ Eur- 
ope in  the  process or  that  the  Middle East  ‘modernised’.  Instead, the more 
nuanced and important proposition is that, with the advent of modernity in the 
19th century, a body of common concepts, ideas and ways of thinking emerges 
which renders  inter-societal communication between  Europe  and  the  Middle 
East possible. For good or ill, and at least in relation to homosexuality, there 
has been a single notion of time since that historical point. 
Massad’s  argument on modernity and the Middle East is closely linked to 
the  second  problematic  idea  implied  by  his  views  on  homosexuality:  that 
Western actors, not the people of the Middle East, shape and control the debate 
on homosexuality in the region. Massad denies that he claims that ‘lesbian and 
gay identity in Egypt is strictly a product of US and European-based transna- 
tional queer organizations’.68   However (and he admits as much by using the 
word ‘strictly’)  there is no escaping the conclusion that he does. For Massad, 
gays in Egypt and the Middle East more generally are not free, morally respon- 
sible agents, making choices about their sexuality and gender, because these 
choices are enforced on them by someone else, namely the West. 
On this issue Massad’s approach has a lot in common with a postcolonial 
strand of thought which treats at least some of the elites dominant after the end 
of colonialism as creatures of the West, imbued with Western ideas and ‘presup- 
positions’.69  For example, in the words of Ling: ‘Postcolonial scholars have 
documented amply those anti-colonial struggles that, once won, unreﬂexively 
reproduce the same old colonial power relations, including old hierarchies of 
race, gender, class, and culture’.70 
Massad is right to  claim that Western interventions in  the  homosexuality 
issue distort local realities. It is also the case that these local realities cannot be 
understood without reference to the international context, within which ‘cultural 
identity’  is deﬁned, invariably against the West. However, he pushes the argu- 
ment further than that and speaks of domination and the ability to determine 
   
 
these realities. It is this, more extreme argument of his that is challenged by a 
string of authors who marshal evidence against the idea that homosexuals in the 
region are creatures of the West. For example, Scott Long argues that Massad 
has an exaggerated sense of the coherence and capacity of the ‘Gay Interna- 
tional’ to achieve results,71  and that a collective identity has developed indige- 
nously in the Middle East (and in Egypt in particular, which is Long’s  focus): 
‘many  men do identify as “gay”, and they are not only rich, Westernized Cai- 
renes’.72   Furthermore, Massad’s assumption ‘that  men in Cairo or Tanta adopt 
an alien identity passively at the prompting of Western models denies individual 
inﬂection  or  equivocation’.73   Momin Rahman posits that many gay Muslims 
would challenge ‘the  exclusive identiﬁcation of homosexuality and homo-eroti- 
cism with “western” culture, simply by ﬁrst acknowledging that there are those 
from Muslim cultures who are, as we understand it, “gay”’.74  Finally, Rahul 
Rao argues: 
 
While there is much truth to Massad’s  claims about the aggressively orientalizing 
tendencies of some contemporary Western LGBT  [lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans- 
gender] activism, there is also something deeply troubling about his denial of the 
agency and subjectivity of Arabs who are appropriating and reworking Western 
identities in their struggles for sexual self-determination. Massad dismisses such 
individuals as unrepresentative – ‘a  miniscule minority’,  ‘small  groups of men in 
metropolitan areas  such  as  Cairo  and  Beirut’  – but  also,  more  ominously, as 
‘native informants’ to Western activists, a phrase that is loaded with colonial 
memories of indigenous elites engaged in traitorous collaboration with colonizing 
powers.
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  A humanist alternative 
Rahul Rao’s critique of Massad over agency is a self-proclaimed postcolonial 
critique, albeit from a very different interpretation of postcolonialism. The dis- 
agreement between Massad and Rao is symptomatic of the wider rift between 
postcolonialism’s  post-structuralist76  and humanist or materialist strands, which 
runs through the writings of many of its theorists and effectively renders postco- 
lonialism a ‘divided  house’.77   The source of the rift can be traced to Edward 
Said’s conﬂicting and ultimately self-contradictory views on Michel Foucault, 
and speciﬁcally the latter’s approach to power and agency. 
Foucault claimed that there is a discourse of power and another discourse 
that runs counter to it.
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He argued that, where there is power, there is resistance 
to it.
79  
However, he did not explain why and how power is resisted, leaving us 
to wonder on what grounds a responsible moral agent would do so. His anti- 
foundationalism made him refuse to say why power should be resisted, what 
principles legitimate a just resistance.
80  
Another reason why Foucault failed to 
explain how power is resisted is that his deﬁnition of power (at least in his 
History of Sexuality) is extraordinarily woolly: he does not see ‘power’ as deriv- 
ing from the state or as a form of rule or the domination of one group over 
another but, rather, as ‘the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere 
in which they operate and which constitute their own organization’.81   Foucault 
treats  power  as  an  ‘impersonal,  deterministic  structure  and  thereby  fails  to 
   
 
explain how power is exercised by individuals who bear the responsibility for 
their actions’.82 
Some would question the idea that Foucault denies agency. It seems incon- 
trovertible to me, however, that it is fatally undermined by his anti-foundational- 
ism.  More pertinently, it seemed  so  to  Said.  Orientalism drew  on  Foucault 
extensively, as we saw. However, Said’s political activism and his commitment 
to the importance of the ‘author’  or ‘agent’  afﬁrmed his belief in agency.83  In 
Culture and Imperialism he made the case that resistance is possible. Most 
explicitly, in a paper on Foucault Said complained that the latter let power go 
‘more  or less unchecked’,  because he saw it as being ‘everywhere’.  ‘With this 
profoundly pessimistic view went also a singular lack of interest in the force of 
effective resistance to it, in choosing particular sites of intensity, choices which, 
we see from the evidence on all sides, always exist and are often successful in 
impeding, if not actually stopping, the progress of tyrannical power’.84 
We saw in the previous section that Massad claimed that his argument built 
on Said’s ideas. However, Massad’s denial of agency, which places him in the 
poststructuralist camp, close to Foucault, by implication distances him from Said 
(or at least the line in Said which afﬁrms agency). The evidence from the case 
of homosexuality in the Middle East, as interpreted in this paper, suggests, con- 
tra Massad and in agreement with Rao (or contra the Foucauldian postcolonial 
line and in agreement with the line in Said which afﬁrms agency), that those 
individuals in  the  Middle East who  identify themselves as  homosexuals and 
may choose to proclaim themselves as such are responsible agents, not passive 
victims of Western domination. The self-description of men and women in the 
Middle East as homosexual is not pre-determined by Western hegemony but the 
result of choice by morally responsible individuals. The choices of those indi- 
viduals may be constrained by Western hegemonic structures but are not pre- 
determined by them. With regards to modernity and historical time, the spread 
of  the  idea  of  ‘homosexuality’  in  the  Middle  East  from  the  19th  century 
onwards shows that, after that point, Middle Eastern societies and their citizens 
begin to share with Europe common notions and ordering principles about the 
self, society and the world. This does not mean that Europe and the Middle East 
have identical experiences of modernity with regard to that issue. It means that 
they begin to have in common a sufﬁcient number of concepts to make these 
experiences mutually intelligible and allow communication across societies and 
regions. Europeans and Middle Easterners become fellow travellers in the mod- 
ern condition.
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Conclusion:  implications for homosexual rights in the Middle 
East 
I have argued that the empirical material, as presented and interpreted in this 
paper (through my inevitably limited, partial and subjective lens, of course), can 
contribute to the debate between the different interpretations of postcolonial 
international theory  by  highlighting  the  weaknesses  of  its  post-structuralist 
strand and buttressing a humanist or materialist interpretation. In turn, the con- 
clusions of this theoretical discussion, by shedding light on the insidious inter- 
twining of culture and power in the debates on homosexuality in the Middle 
East, may strengthen the foundation for respect for homosexual rights in the 
   
 
region. Postcolonialism has, arguably, failed to become a platform for a radical 
critique.
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A humanist or materialist perspective, from  its  starting point  that 
there exists a commonality of experience, underpinned by modernity, between 
the West and ‘non-West’ (and with the understanding that universalism is not by 
necessity imperialist), can provide such a platform. 
If, as is argued in this paper, those individuals who choose to assert their 
homosexual identity and rights in the Middle East must be recognised as respon- 
sible and free moral agents, the same applies  to  those  who  persecute  and 
oppress them. In treating homosexuals as deviants and traitors to their ‘culture’, 
the latter have chosen to shun their societies’ historical past which, as we saw, 
included the widespread practice and tacit acceptance of what later came to be 
called ‘homosexuality’. In simplistically associating ‘homosexuality’ with ‘the 
West’, they conveniently forget that the category ‘homosexual’, and the 
opprobrium associated with it, was closely associated with 19th century European 
colonialism.
87  
Historical amnesia is combined with a deliberate overlooking of 
the continuing and widespread existence of same-sex practices, particularly in 
more ‘traditional’ settings, such as the madrasas (religious schools).88  These 
practices are tolerated in so far as they do not endanger central institutions, in 
particular the family.
89  
Similarly to what continues to happen in some Western 
settings,
90  
it is only when homosexual identity is asserted and homosexuals 
demand respect, as  such,  that  they  are  deemed a  threat to  the social order. 
The negative attitudes towards homosexuality held by the bulk of Middle 
Eastern societies buttress and, in turn, are buttressed by authoritarian govern- 
ments, conservative religious leaders, traditionalist patriarchs and, not least, 
matriarchs. Their authority is shored up by the call to protect an ‘authentic’ 
culture which, if it ever existed, has long ago been wiped out. At the current 
juncture of Middle Eastern history, Islamists (and in particular the fundamental- 
ists among  them),  both  in  government and  in  opposition,  steer  their  fellow 
citizens in  the  direction of  collective oblivion and  wilful ignorance when  it 
comes to the subject of homosexuality. The viliﬁcation of homosexuals in the 
Middle East epitomises the distortions and subjugations brought about by the 
search for an elusive ‘authentic’ cultural self. 
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